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Predictive processing and extended consciousness: why the machinery of consciousness
is (probably) still in the head and the DEUTS argument won’t let it leak outside
Abstract:
Recently, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have argued that the extended consciousness thesis,
namely the claim that the material vehicles of consciousness extends beyond our heads, is
entirely compatible with, and mandated by, the predictive processing framework. To do so,
they rely on a potent argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis, namely the
Dynamical Entanglement and Unique Temporal Signature (DEUTS) argument. Here, we will
critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor, arguing for the following three
claims. First, we will claim that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on culture and cultural
practices does not help them substantiate the extended consciousness thesis. Secondly, we
will argue that the way in which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein formalize the boundaries of a
subject’s conscious mind is inadequate, as it yields conclusions running counter some of their
assumptions. Lastly, we will argue that the DEUTS argument does not establish the extended
consciousness thesis, as it licenses a “consciousness bloat” objection which is exactly
analogous to the “cognitive bloat” objection to the extended mind thesis. We will thus
conclude that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s proposed marriage between the extended
consciousness thesis and predictive processing fails, and that, contrary to a popular opinion,
DEUTS is not a strong argument in favor of the extended consciousness thesis.
Keywords: Predictive Processing, Free-Energy Principle, Markov Blankets, Extended
Consciousness, Sensorimotor Enactivism.
1 - Introduction
The extended consciousness thesis, or consciousness vehicle externalism (CVE) claims
that the material vehicles of a subject’s consciousness at least sometimes include the1
subject’s active body and/or some appropriate environmental prop (Hurley 2010; Vold 215).
Sensorimotor enactivists endorse CVE. They claim that phenomenally conscious
perception is achieved by an embodied agent by interacting sensomotorically with the
environment; for instance, by saccading over a visual target so as to explore its visual profile.
They argue that the phenomenal qualities of perception are determined by sensorimotor
contingencies: law-like relations holding between bodily movements and changes in sensory
1 We will use “consciousness” to refer to phenomenal consciousness throughout the paper.
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stimulation (O’Regan and Noë 2001a; 2001b; Hurley and Noë 2003; O’Regan 2011). On
their view, perceivers possess a tacit body of knowledge concerning such relations, called
sensorimotor mastery, that they exert so as to enact their perceptual experiences; that is,
perceptually explore the environment so as to reveal it phenomenally. The vehicles of
perceptual phenomenology thus include, alongside patterns of neuronal activation, bodily acts
of perceptual exploration guided by the perceiver sensorimotor mastery (Noë 2004, 2009;
Kiverstein and Farina 2012; Pepper 2014).
This formulation of CVE has recently been put under significant pressure by the
neurocomputational framework of predictive processing (PP). This is because PP allows to
operationalize sensorimotor contingencies in purely neural terms, as expectations concerning
the incoming inputs encoded in a generative model (e.g. Pezzulo et al 2017; Baltieri and
Buckley 2019). The perceiver mastery of sensorimotor contingencies is thus “pushed inside
the brain”, and ends up regulating only neuronal message-passing, leaving no reason to
endorse CVE (Clark 2012; Seth 2014).2
Recently, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a; 2019b; 2020) set off to revise this dialectical
situation, showing that a properly understood PP mandates CVE (Kirchhoff 2018; Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a: 57-59; 83-86). To do so, they carefully analyze the conceptual
apparatus of PP, and use it to formulate the most potent argument in favor of CVE in the
sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal; namely the Dynamical Entanglement and Unique Temporal
Signature (DEUTS, see § 3 below) argument.
Here, we diagnose three problems in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s proposal. First, we argue
that their appeal to cultural practices does little to support CVE. Secondly, we argue that their
usage of Markov Blankets (more on which in §2) to formalize the boundaries of a subject’s
2 Importantly, when issues regarding CVE are left aside, PP and sensorimotor enactivism have a far less hostile
relation both conceptually (e.g. Vázquez 2020) and empirically (e.g. Laflaquiere 2017; Leinweber et al. 2017).
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conscious mind yields results that clash with some of their theoretical commitments. Lastly,
we argue that the DEUTS argument generates a “consciousness bloat” problem analogous to
the “cognitive bloat” problem affecting the extended mind thesis (see Sprevak 2009;
Rowlands 2010). We will thus conclude that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s endeavor fails to
secure a happy marriage between CVE and PP, and that, contrary to a popular opinion (Clark
2009; 2013; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a), the DEUTS argument is not a strong argument
in favor of CVE.
Here's our plan. In the next two sections, we will sketch PP and Kirchhoff and Kivertein’s
position respectively. In section four, we will turn from exposition to criticism, articulating
our three claims. A brief concluding paragraph follows.
2 - Predictive processing and the free-energy principle: a quick introduction
PP is a neurocomputational framework providing a process theory for Friston’s
free-energy principle (Friston and Stephan 2007; Hohwy 2020). We succinctly introduce
them here. Readers already familiar with these frameworks might wish to skip ahead.3
The free-energy principle states that biological self-organization is centered around the
avoidance of surprisal: an information-theoretic measure of the unexpectedness of sensory
states, given a model (implicitly realized by the organism’s embodiment) of the sensory states
compatible with the organism’s prolonged existence, which the organism should expect to
occupy (Friston 2012a; 2013). Organisms, however, cannot track surprisal directly. They can
only track its upper bound, which is (variational) free-energy (Friston 2009). Free-energy is
an upper bound on surprisal because it can be understood as surprisal plus a second, always
positive, quantity, which is the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (DKL): a measure of how much
3 For more introductory material, see (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016; Tani 2016; Wiese and Metzinger 2017).
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the system’s “guesses” about the causes of its states are aligned with reality. Since surprisal is
also the complement of model evidence (Friston 2019: 177), minimizing it amounts to
producing the evidence in favor of one’s model of one’s prolonged existence.
Surprisal-minimizing systems are thus self-evidencing systems (Hohwy 2016): systems
striving to bring about the evidence favoring the hypothesis that they exist, thereby
prolonging their existence.
In the context of the free-energy principle, such models are understood as the states
enclosed by a Markov Blanket (Hohwy 2017; Friston et al. 2020). Markov Blankets are
formal boundaries that separate a biological system from its niche in a statistical sense, while
allowing the two to causally interact (Friston 2013; Friston et al. 2020). The interaction is4
allowed by the internal partition of the Markov Blanket: active states allow the organism to
influence its niche, whereas sensory states allow the niche to influence the organism. In this
way, the Markov Blanket allows a two-way causal interaction between organism and niche,
enabling the coupling between the two (Hohwy 2017; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:
65-67).
Importantly, according to the free-energy principle, Markov Blankets are multiple and
nested, and can be found at each and every level of organization (Kirchhoff et al. 2018). A
biological system such as a wolf, for instance, can be decomposed in biological sub-systems
(e.g. cells) and can partake in larger systems (e.g. a pack), each busy minimizing free-energy
(and thus, equipped with Markov Blankets).
The free-energy principle can be related to PP by noticing that free-energy can be equated
4 There is a vast philosophical literature on Markov Blankets, detailing how this conception of Markov Blankets
is removed from the one relevant in machine learning (e.g. Bruinenerg et al. 2020). There is also a current
controversy on the ontological status of Markov Blankets, concerning whether they are objective features of
biological systems or just modelling tools (see Menary and Gillet 2020; Andrews 2021). Here, we will assume
for the sake of discussion that the realistic reading is correct, as it seems the one espoused by Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein (2019a; 2019b).
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(under some assumptions, see Buckely et al. 2017) with prediction error: a well-known
neural signal posited by predictive coding accounts of neural functioning (e.g. Rao and
Ballard 1999, Friston 2005). In the context of PP, prediction error names the mismatch
between endogenously generated sensory states, which are the ones the agent expects or
predicts, and actually received ones. On the view of the mind PP proposes, the primary
function of brains is to minimize prediction errors, and cognition unfolds as a consequence of
error minimization.
Prediction error can be minimized in two ways (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). One is by
revising the expectations, fitting them to the received sensory signals. This is perceptual
recognition, which, in free-energy terms, corresponds to decreasing the DKL. Another way to
minimize prediction error is by changing the received sensory states through movement, so as
to bring about the expected ones. This is active inference, which, in free-energy terms,
corresponds to a direct minimization of surprisal.
Importantly, prediction errors are always weighted based on their expected precision:
roughly, an estimate of the signal to noise ratio of the sensory signals giving rise to prediction
errors. In this way, sensory signals generated by highly noisy sensory states will be
dampended, thereby allowing only informative prediction errors to dominate neural
processing (Feldman and Friston 2010).
Active inference puts PP in direct contact with sensorimotor enactivism. This is because
active inference is performed by predicting the sensory consequences of one’s movement,
and then canceling out the error they generate through movement (Friston 2011; Adams et al.
2013). Hence, on the account of action predictive processing offers, to perform a movement
m an agent must first predict the sensory outcomes m, which are the sensory states the agent
would encounter, were m performed. So, on the account of action PP offers, the agent must
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know how actions systematically impact the incoming sensory stream; that is, the agent must
know the relevant sensorimotor contingencies, and exert their mastery by predicting a
“desirable” stream of sensory inputs.5
Notice how this makes an agent’s mastery of sensorimotor contingencies a purely neural
affair (Seth 2014), pushing us towards an indirect and (vehicle) internalist view of perception
(Wiese 2018). If the perceiver’s mastery of sensorimotor contingencies is neurally realized,
and sensorimotor contingencies only mediate the message passing in a neurally realized
generative model, then perception naturally appears an internal affair.
Notice, lastly, that PP is not a theory of consciousness (phenomenal or otherwise), even if
it seems able to account for at least some structural aspects of consciousness and might be
relevant for the empirical research on consciousness (see Seth and Hohwy 2020). Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein, however, seem to take PP as a theory of consciousness. For instance, they
write:
“Predictive processing tells us what the parts of the system must be doing such
that when these parts are organised in the right way, they constitute
consciousness. The parts of the system will include, for instance, components
that perform predictions, error calculation, precision estimation, and so on.”
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 104).
We concede the point for the sake of argument. Crucially, however, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
hold that only temporally thick generative models qualify as consciousness supporting
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 106-108, see also Hobson and Friston 2014). Here, we will
assess the temporal thickness of generative models using the following heuristic: the more the
model allows a system to make larger loops in the space of all its possible states, the
temporally thicker it is (Friston 2018: 5-6). For instance, a model that allows a subject to
5 Notice that in more traditional theories of motor control such a role is played by forward models (also called
motor emulators), which have already been used to operationalize sensorimotor contingencies (e.g. Maye and
Engel 2013).
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celebrate her birthday on an annual basis is considerably thicker than the model of an agent
that loops through its state space every few seconds. This way of proceeding seems to fit
quite nicely with Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s (2019a: 55-57) understanding of models,
according to which models are first and foremost entire organisms.6
But what are temporally thick models made of? What is the machinery constituting them?
PP suggests that this machinery is squarely located within brains. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
disagree. Let us see why.
3 - The DEUTS argument, twenty(ish) years later
DEUTS is often considered the strongest argument for CVE (Clark 2009; 2013; Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a). Its origins trace back to (Hurley 1998: Ch.8). There, she makes a
two-stepped argument. Here, we briefly present each step in its original variant, followed by
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s PP rendition of it.
3.1.1 - The first step: Dynamical Entanglement
The first step claims that cognitive processing sometimes weaves agent and environment
in a single system. This claim stems from dynamical approaches to cognition, according to
which cognitive processing is not “sandwiched” between perception and action (Hurley
2001), but rather constituted by cyclical sensorimotor interactions. These interactions are best
6 There are other ways to determine the temporal thickness of a model. One is simply that of observing its
hierarchical structure, in which hierarchically higher layers generate predictions over longer timescales, and are
thus temporally thicker than hierarchically lower ones. But this way of proceeding seems to apply only to
hierarchically structured internal (brain-like) models (e.g. Tani 2016: Ch. 9-10). Hence, it would beg the
question against Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 55) understanding of models. Another way to capture the
temporal thickness of a model may be in terms of expected free energy (Corcoran et al. 2020): roughly, the
free-energy expected in the future, after active inference has been performed. However, expected free-energy
might not accurately model the free-energy expected in the future, and hence it might prove inadequate to
capture the temporal thickness of a model (Millidge et al. 2021). We rely on Friston’s (2018) heuristic to avoid
these problems.
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explained using the formal tools of dynamical systems theory (e.g. Hurley 1998; Chemero
2009) which allow to quantitatively model and predict them. This explanatory methodology,
however, often forces one to model agent and environment as a single (non-decomposable)
coupled system, whose behavior can be accounted for only by using its order parameters ,7
and whose dynamics accounts for the production of cognitive outputs (Lamb and Chemero
2018). Hence, in those cases, agent and environment form a single cognitive system, which
vindicates a form of vehicle externalism about cognition (Palermos 2014; Kiverstein 2018).
How can this dynamical image of (extended) cognition be related to PP?
3.1.2 - Dynamical Entanglement and Predictive Processing.
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein commence by noticing that prediction error minimization is a
tool for surprisal avoidance. But surprisal can be avoided only through active inference ; that8
is, embodied action. Thus within PP, real, embodied action is central to cognition (Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a: 57-59).
Secondly, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein notice that albeit Markov Blankets statistically
separate agent and environment, they also enable the coupling of the two (Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019a: 65-67; see also Fabry 2017). This is due to the interplay of the active and
sensory states that jointly constitute the blanket. Recall: active states influence sensory and
external states, and are influenced by internal states. Conversely, sensory states influence
active and internal states, and are influenced by external states. Thus, together, active and9
sensory states enable internal and external states to interlock in a two way interaction, which
9 Notice, importantly, that sensory and active states influence each other, and are thus coupled. This, on
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s (2019a: 69) view, allows Markov Blankets to capture the idea of sensorimotor
contingencies.
8 Notice that here we are dealing with surprisal. Free-energy can be minimized in other ways too, as indicated
above.
7 An order parameter (or collective variable) is a variable describing the behavior of the components of the
entire system. See (Kelso 1995, Ch 1 and 2) for a useful introduction.
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is a form of coupling.
In third place, relying on Clark’s (2017) metamorphosis argument, Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein stress that Markov Blankets are not just multiple and nested, but also malleable
and plastic. Clark invites us to consider metamorphic insects, and the boundary (i.e. the
Markov Blanket) separating them from the environment. As the insect undergoes the
metamorphic process, it re-negotiates that boundary, shifting the set of states that separates it
from the environment (trivially, the silk a cocoon is made of is not the exoskeleton of the
caterpillar). Hence, Markov Blankets are not fixed: self-evidencing models such as
metamorphic insects may undergo dramatic changes, thereby shifting the Blanket separating
them from their niche. To this, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein add that, at least sometimes, these
shifts can “push inside the Blanket” some environmental prop essential to the self-evidencing
of an agent. This is the case of a spider and its web, or of a mildly amnesic patient and the
notebook he uses to compensate for his amnesia (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 73-76;
2019b).
Consider this point in the light of the coupling Markov Blankets enable. If an agent can be
dynamically entangled with an external resource, they form a single coupled dynamical
system. And if it avoids surprisal (e.g. Bruineberg 2018b) it will be a free-energy/prediction
error minimizing system in its own right, with its own Markov Blanket. In such a case, the
coupled system will be identified through a “wider” Markov Blanket, encompassing
“smaller” coupled Markov Blankets. The “wider” Markov Blanket will act as an order
parameter on the “smaller” Blankets it contains, constraining their degrees of freedom and
coalescing them in a single, possibly extended, system (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:
80-81). In Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, such a Blanket identifies the relevant cognitive
machinery, namely, the relevant self-evidencing model engaged in prediction
STILL AN UNSUBMITTED WIP, BUT FEEL FREE TO USE 10/41
error/free-energy minimization. They hold that, by default, such a model encompasses the
entire organism (Kircchoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 55-57), but, as the metamorphosis
argument purportedly shows, it can extend to incorporate the environmental props the system
is coupled to, allowing the creation “on the spot” of extended free-energy/prediction error
minimizing systems. In this way, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein resort to Markov Blankets to
formalize the boundaries of (extended) cognitive systems.
Here, we summarized Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s PP inspired rendition of the first step of
the DEUTS argument – the “Dynamical Entanglement” bit. Yet, thus far, the argument seems
only an argument for vehicle externalism about cognition. Where does consciousness come
into play? To answer this question, we need to look into the second step of the DEUTS
argument – the “Unique Temporal Signature” bit
3.2.1 -  The second step: Unique temporal Signature
The idea behind the second step of the argument is that a careful consideration of the
temporal development of our experiences (their “unique temporal signature”) shows that the
dynamical avenue to vehicle externalism about cognition entails CVE.
To claim so, Hurley (1998: Ch. 8) starts by granting the familiar vehicle internalist
intuition that if the machinery of consciousness is purely neural, then keeping a subject’s
neural state constant will keep the subject’s phenomenology constant, whatever the
environment. Hence, if the machinery of consciousness is purely neural, two subjects can be
neural and phenomenal duplicates without being environmental duplicates.
To attack it, Hurley (1998: Ch.8) argues that two dynamically entangled subjects cannot be
neural and phenomenal duplicates without being also environmental duplicates. To see why,
consider a simplified rendering of one of Hurley’s (1998: 303-314) thought experiments. On
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earth, subject S is in an entirely white room, containing only S and a black ball on S’s right.
On twin earth, S’s physical duplicate TS is in the exact same situation. Since S and TS are
physical duplicates, it seems correct to say S and TS are experiencing the same thing: what it
feels like to be in a white room with a black ball at one’s right. Here, S and TS are
phenomenal, neural and environmental duplicates. But (and this is the vehicle internalist
intuition) S and TS could be phenomenal duplicates just by being neural duplicates: we could
switch the place of TS’s ball from right to left and insert in TS’s eyes left-to-right inverting
lenses, so as to keep the visual input TS receives constant (Hurley 1998: 304). In this case, it
seems correct to say that TS and S will be in the same neural state, undergoing the same
experience.
Hurley (1998: 327) suggests this is possible only because S and TS are passive perceivers,
and thus they are not coupled with the environment in any meaningful way. Were S and TS
dynamically entangled with their (different) environments, they would cease to be
phenomenal duplicates. Suppose, for instance, that S and TS try to touch the ball when
they’re not environmental duplicates. They will both move their right arms towards the ball
(which they both see at their right), causing their neural and phenomenal states to diverge.
For S will touch the ball, whereas TS will not. So only S’n neural state will be modified by
the reafferent signals. As a result, only S will experience what it is like to touch a ball. In this
case, phenomenal duplication fails.
To duplicate the experience of the dynamical entangled S to be duplicated in TS, one
needs to make S and TS environmental duplicates; that is, one has to remove the lenses from
TS’s eyes and displace TS’s ball in its original position. Only in this case S’s temporally
extended experience can be duplicated in TS. So, in order for the phenomenology of a
dynamically entangled subject to be duplicated, it is not sufficient that the subject and their
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twin are neural duplicates. They also need to be environmental duplicates.10
But what needs to be the case in order for a phenomenal state to occur is the vehicle of
that state (Hurely 1998: 330-331). And, in the example just considered, what needs to be the
case for the relevant phenomenal states to occur includes at least some environmental factors.
Hence, if a subject is dynamically entangled, environmental factors are vehicles of its
consciousness (Hurley 1998: 330-335). Reflections on the unique temporal development of
experiences thus show that dynamical entanglement entails CVE. Importantly, such a
procedure to identify the external vehicle of consciousness is supposed to be discriminating
(Hurley 1998; 330-331); that is, it is supposed to be able to tell apart genuine external
vehicles of a subject’s consciousness from external factors merely impacting it.
3.2.2 - Unique Temporal Signature and Predictive Processing
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 36; 112-115; 2020: 5-9) build essentially on the same
point. Yet they would emphasize the role of the cultural environment in the constitution of
one’s experience (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 5 and 6; 2020). This is because they
adhere to a “third wave” form of vehicle externalism, asserting that the cognitive (and
phenomenal) machinery has no fixed properties. Rather, its properties are constantly
transformed by the cultural practices the subject masters, and these properties have to be11
constantly negotiated by engaging with the surrounding cultural niche (Kirchhoff and
11 To our knowledge, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein do not provide an explicit definition of cultural practices.
However, it seems that they interpret cultural practices as relatively stable, socially regimented, ways of
interaction, which induce a relatively stable sensory flow to which an agent can attune its expectations (cfr.
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2020). This way of understanding cultural practices might derive from Kiverstein’s
past work on the skilled intentionality framework, which explicitly understands practices as “stable ways of
doing things” (Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; see also Rietveld et al. 2018 for a presentation of the framework).
Many thanks to a colleague for having pointed this out.
10 Importantly, the environmental duplication need not be total:only the environmental factors with which S is
dynamically entangled need to be duplicated in TS. Non-phenomenology-shaping aspects of the environment
might still systematically differ.
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Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 5; 2020). Subjects are thus enculturated, in the sense that their
participation in cultural practices and their attunement to their cultural niches transforms
them and alters their properties.
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein hold that cultural practices are so important that they can be said,
in a sense, to be vehicles of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness. Their claim seems to be
that cultural practices play a constitutive role in determining the expected precision of the
incoming sensory signal. That is, they contribute to creating a system’s expectation for
certain very reliable streams of prediction error, which enable an agent to quickly deploy its
own embodied skills to effectively cope with some relevant environmental contingency
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 94-100; 2020), thereby shaping one’s subjective
experience. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein provide a variety of examples of this, ranging from
phoneme recognition (Roepstorff et al. 2010, cited in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:
99-100) to color discrimination (Thierry et al. 2009, cited in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:
98).
The example they discuss the most, however, is the culture shock Eva Hofmann felt when
moving from Poland to Canada (Kirchhoff anf Kiverstein 2019a: 110-112; 2020). They argue
that to account for the sense of estrangement Eva felt when moving, we need to refer to her
active engagement with the cultural practices of her native cultural (Polish) environment, and
her inability to enact such practices in the new (Canadian) cultural environment. This makes
Eva’s sensory states in her new cultural niche are surprisal-inducing, as they are not the ones
she learned to predict. Her neural duplicate in the appropriate (Polish) environment would
instead register no surprisal, courtesy of a compliant cultural environment (Kirchhof and
Kiverstein 2019a: 113-114). Hence, in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein view, the cultural practices
Eva took part in and learned while in Poland qualify as vehicles of her phenomenal
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experience. Importantly, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020: 7-9) would add that these practices
constitute Eva’s phenomenology diachronically. This means, roughly, that the culture shock
Eva felt is not exclusively constituted by factors present in the here-and-now (i.e. the moment
when the culture shock is experienced). It is also partially constituted by the factors present in
Eva’s past that account for her experience now. The vehicles of Eva’s experience, diachronic
constitution suggest, are not just spread out in space. They are also spread out in time.
Crucially, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein argue that these culturally-leaden modifications of
conscious experience are not due to the acquisition of specific neural representations. Rather,
they are due to the constant agent-environment interaction; and cultural practices should be
seen as elements regulating the behavior of the agent-environment coupled system, like
macroscopic order parameters organizing the behavior of a dynamical system over very long
timescales (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2020:7). In their view, brains are not equipped with12
culturally learned representations; rather, they are nodes in a complex web of loopy causal
relations, which are constantly transformed by the culturally regimented loops traversing
them.
We end our exposition of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s complex position here, owing to
space limitations. We acknowledge that our summary is incomplete , and that it does not13
convey the entire depth of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s overall position. But it is now time for
us to articulate our claims.
4 - Extended consciousness in predictive processing: three problems
13 We have been silent, for instance, on Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s complex proposal of a diachronic account of
constitution, and we have glossed over a variety of themes proposed in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s book.
12 Notice that, according to Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, this is exactly the role that the “wider” Markov Blanket
should play in cases of dynamical entanglement.
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4.1 - Cultural practices do not seem to support consciousness vehicle externalism
As sketched above, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a; 2020) take cultural practices to be
material vehicles of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness: given the process ontology they
assume (e. g. Kirchoff 2015), the vehicles of consciousness are not physical states but rather
by physical processes extended in time. Among these processes, there are cultural practices,
which determine (at least partially) the expected precision of incoming error signals. Hence,
they play a role in error minimization, thereby partially determining a subject’s phenomenally
conscious states.
Yet, the account of expected precision PP offers is purely neural. PP suggests that neurons
reporting prediction errors with a high expected precision have their post-synaptic gain
increased, so as to make their prediction error dominate subsequent processing. Conversely,
neurons reporting prediction errors with low expected precision get silenced by decreasing
their post synaptic gain. Other mechanisms contribute to precision estimation too: dopamine
can be used to quickly shift the post synaptic gain of error neurons, and synchronization of
error reporting neurons might further increase their ability to influence cortical processing
(see Feldman and Friston 2010; Friston 2012b; Friston et al. 2012). Collectively, these
mechanisms allow our brains to “attend” only the most significant prediction error streams,
thereby simplifying the solution of various cognitive tasks. Yet these mechanisms seem to be
neural mechanisms. No external vehicle is present in the picture of precision estimation PP
proposes. And given that the mechanisms for precision estimation that PP identifies operate
at the neuronal level, it is hard to see just how cultural practices could be integrated in such a
picture.14
14 One could challenge this verdict, arguing that many external signs (e.g. traffic lights, stop signs, etc.) do play a
role in settling our expectations about the precision of the incoming sensory signals, thereby functioning like a
vehicle controlling our precision estimates (see Clark 2016, Ch. 8 and 9). We doubt, however, that Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein can leverage such a challenge against us. This is because this case for vehicle externalism about
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It could be argued that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020: 7-9) provide an answer to this
question, suggesting that cultural practices act as macroscopic order parameters on the
agent-environment system. Yet, we see two problems with this suggestion. First, order
parameters in dynamical systems typically represent physical magnitudes, such as the
temperature gradient controlling the rolling motions of a heated liquid (e.g. Kelso 1995: 6-8),
the frequency of operation of a central pattern generator (e.g. Kiebel et al. 2009) or the
relative angle phase of two oscillators (e.g. Schmidt and Richardson 2008: 283). Hence, it is
not clear whether the concept of an order parameter could be rightfully applied to cultural
practices. Secondly, even allowing cultural practices to play a constraining role on neuronal
dynamics similar to that of order parameters, it is hard to see in what sense such constraints
would qualify as external vehicles of consciousness. Order parameters are not physical
components of a dynamical system. They are mathematical values that perspicuously describe
the state of a dynamical system in a dynamical model. Hence, even assuming that cultural
practices can be cast as order parameters (or something analogous to them), they wouldn’t be
components of the coupled dynamical system they describe (i.e. a subject dynamically
entangled with its environment). Thus, they wouldn’t be vehicles inside that system.15
Perhaps focusing on a concrete case might clarify how cultural practices might function as
external vehicles of subjective experience. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 98-99) take the
experiment performed by Thierry et al. (2009) as evidence of the fact that cultural practices
support CVE. Since the experiment is clearly described, we will consider it at length.
The study (Thierry et al. 2009) involved two groups of participants speaking two different
native languages; namely English and Greek. Participants of both groups were required to
15 Many thanks to two colleagues for discussion on these issues.
precision estimation is built upon a “first wave”-style parity argument for vehicle externalism (cfr. Constant et
al. 2019a: 16-18). But Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a, Ch. 1) do not endorse such a “first wave” form of
vehicle externalism, and are in fact quite critical of it.
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perform an odball stimulus discrimination. The stimulus was a sequence of squares, and the
oddball was a circle. Participants had to press a button as soon as they noticed the circle.
Notice that the stimuli were presented at a fixed rate, hence participants could not influence
the way stimuli were presented. The neural activity of each participant was captured through
an EEG cap. Crucially, albeit participants were required to discriminate shapes, stimuli could
also vary in color. In total, four colors were used: light and deep blue and light and deep
green. Variations in color, however, were task irrelevant: participants had to press the button
only if the oddball (circular) stimulus appeared, independently from its color. Now, there is a
crucial difference between English and Greek native speakers when it comes to the colors.
Whereas both English and Greek use a single word for green (whether deep or light), only
English uses a single word for blue. Greek uses two: galázio (light blue) and ble (deep blue).
Thierry and colleagues found that the early visual cortex of Greek (and only Greek) native
speakers responded differently to the two task irrelevant shades of blue. Both English and
Greek native speakers respond in the same way to the two shades of green. The researchers
concluded that their data support the claim that color terminology can influence early visual
processing.
We really do not see how this experiment is supposed to bolster the case for CVE. Let us
start with consciousness. The experiment does not establish that Greek and English native
speakers experience color differently. The data speaks only of a “[...] relationship between
native language and unconscious, preattentive color discrimination rather than simply
conscious, overt color categorization” (Thierry et al. 2009: 4568; emphasis added).
Moreover, whether early visual cortices qualify as neural correlates of consciousness is still a
matter of debate (Chalmers 2000; Blake et al. 2014; Koch et al. 2016), so it is at least in
principle possible that color terminology only influences non conscious visual processing.
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Now, suppose (for the sake of argument) that color terminology influences color
phenomenology. Still, in the case at hand, it is not clear what are the relevant external
vehicles that should “extend” a subject’s color phenomenology. There are empirical studies
that try to assess the impact of external objects on cognitive processing (e.g.
Vallé-Tourangeau et al. 2016; Bocanegra et al. 2019), and these studies can be used to offer
empirical support to vehicle externalism. But in these studies experimenters carefully
describe the “external vehicles” involved, and what sort of effects they have on cognition.
Thierry and colleagues do nothing of that sort. They neither describe the external vehicles
that might “extend” their subject’s consciousness, nor they try to describe the impact of such
vehicles on subjective experience. And rightfully so: as described in their paper, their
experimental procedure just does not involve any external vehicle.
Moreover, the experimental subjects do not appear to be dynamically entangled to
anything in the environment. Participants were only required to press a button when the
oddball was detected, and stimuli were presented every 800ms and flashed for 200ms,
regardless of the subjects’ responses. There is no closed causal or sensorimotor loop knitting
together participants and environment in a single system. There just seems to be no instance
of continuous reciprocal causation or coupling (Palermos 2014). And, in fact, contra
dynamical views of cognition (Hurley 2001) the participant’s task is easily decomposable in a
linear sequence of input (stimulus reception) - cognition (discrimination) - action (eventual
button pressing).
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020: 5-7) might object that mastering a cultural practice is an
essentially extended affair since a subject’s mastery of a cultural practice requires that the
subject constantly attunes to her cultural environment, interacting with it. Hence, cultural16
16 Similar arguments for the essential extendedness of cognitive capacities are provided in (Noë 2004: 110-115)
and (Hurley 2010: 138-143).
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practices cannot be fully internalized in a set of culturally-shapened neural representations:
mastering them requires constant agent-(cultural) environment interactions.
But this argument appears unconvincing. In general, the fact that an agent’s mastery in a
domain is achieved and maintained by means of constant environmental interactions does not
pull the vehicles realizing that mastery out of the agent’s body. Amy’s mastery in
weightlifting, for instance, has been achieved (and must constantly be maintained) by
engaging with environmental props and tools (e.g. barbell weights). Yet, the material vehicles
realizing her mastery (e.g. her muscle tone and her practical know-how on how to lift heavy
weights) seem entirely internal to her body. And the same seems to hold for the mastery of
cultural practices: one’s mastery of a language depends critically on one’s continued
linguistic engagement with a certain linguistic environment. But the vehicles realizing one’s
linguistic mastery (e.g. one’s Broca’s area) sit squarely in one’s skull.
Importantly, vehicle internalism allows cultural practices to have an effect on perceptual
consciousness. The case of phonetic recognition (i.e. how our perception of linguistic stimuli
changes based on the languages we know; see Roepstroff et al. 2010) persuasively
exemplifies the effects of culture on our phenomenology. Indeed, the theoretical apparatus of
PP seems almost ideally suited to account for such effects (see Lupyan et al. 2020 for a recent
review). This is because PP heavily stresses the role of prior expectations (both about the
incoming sensory inputs and their precision) in perception, and in particular in determining
perceptual content. Hence, if cultural practices tailor a subject’s estimate of precision, and
these estimates impact (or concur to impact) a subject’s perceptual content, then cultural
practices can impact the content of a subject’s consciousness.
Notice that a form of content externalism would be broadly consonant with Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein’s overall position on cultural practices. As noted by Clark and Chalmers (1998),
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content (as opposed to vehicle) externalism tends to stress factors lying in a subject’s past
history, such as the subject’s embedding in a linguistic community (e.g. Putnam 1975). And
these seem to be the factors that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein emphasize when discussing the
case of Eva’s culture shock and the diachronic constitution of her experience (see Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a: 110-112; 2020: 9-10). Moreover, in at least some cases (e.g. Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a: 111) they speak of cultural practices as settling our prior expectations.
But, on the face of it, expectations are contentful states, whose content might be at least
partially determined by some relevant cultural practice. For instance, a person born in a
British English speaking cultural niche might expect to read “colour” instead of “color”.
So, perhaps Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on cultural practices can vindicate (or
motivate) some form of externalism about perceptual content. However, content externalism
does not entail CVE. To begin with, contents and vehicles should not be conflated; and, in
fact, their conflation is in general fallacious (Dennett 1991; Hurley 1998). Secondly, content
and vehicle externalism are logically independent, and do not entail each other (Hurley 2010;
Rowlands 2020). The fact that conscious content is (perhaps) determined by extraneural
factors does not, in and by itself, entail that the vehicle of said content is extraneural.
4.2 - The Markov Blankets of the conscious mind
In the PP literature, the issues concerning vehicle externalism are typically framed in
terms of Markov Blankets. Given that everyone agrees that Markov Blankets are multiple and
nested, the relevant issues concern how to determine which Markov Blanket delineates the
boundary of a subject’s mind (e.g. Hohwy 2016; 2017; Clark 2017).
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein propose a crisp answer: the relevant Markov Blanket identifying
the vehicles of a subject’s phenomenally conscious mind is the “wider” Markov Blanket
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surrounding “smaller” coupled Markov Blankets and acting as an order parameter on their
synchronization (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 78-81). This is because the self-evidencing
behavior of the “wider” Blanket constraints and determines the self-evidencing behavior of
the smaller Blankets, forming “a prediction error minimizing whole” (Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019a: 81).
Here, we wish to argue that this way of identifying the Markov Blanket surrounding the
vehicle of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness leads to very unpalatable results, which also
clash with Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s claim that only temporally thick generative models can
support phenomenally conscious mental states.
To see why, consider first the relevant notion of coupling at play. In the literature on
Markov Blankets, the relevant notion of coupling is typically operationalized in terms of
generalized synchrony (e.g. Friston 2013; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al.
2018a; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 108-110; 2020: fn. 3; Palacios et al. 2019).17
Generalized synchrony refers to a physical relation holding between a set of oscillators. If
two (or more) oscillators interact (and influence each other’s oscillations), they will
eventually start to oscillate either in phase (i.e. with the same rate) or in anti-phase (i.e. with
opposite rates). When one of these two conditions is reached, then generalized synchrony
among the oscillators has been established, and the two oscillators can be considered as a
single coupled system.
Secondly, consider the (seemingly well-established) claim that any two PP systems busy
modelling each other rapidly fall into generalized synchrony (e.g. Friston and Frith 2015a;
2015b; Palacios et al. 2019). The reason as to why this is the case can be clearly expressed as
17 This holds true also in some dynamical models (e.g. Schmidt and Richardson 2008; Chemero 2009: 85-98).
Intriguingly, (Kirchhoff et al. 2018) seem to point to a different, more demanding, notion of coupling. However,
as far as we can see, such a notion of coupling is still lacking an operationalization.
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follows. Suppose that two agents (A and B) partake in a turn based activity, and suppose that
they are both busy predicting what the other agent will do in its own turn. Now, when it’s A’s
turn, B will try to predict the sensory consequences of A’s moves. But, and this is the crucial
point, A is predicting them too. For, if PP is correct, in order for A to take a move, A is bound
to engage in active inference; and it is thus forced to predict the sensory consequences of its
own moves. This is why the activity of two mutually predicting PP systems will tend to
synchronize.
Different sources of empirical evidence reinforce the point, suggesting that interacting
subjects tend to synchronize in a number of ways (see Wheatley et al. 2012; Coey et al. 2012;
Tognoli et al. 2020 for reviews). Behavioral experiments suggest that interacting subjects
spontaneously synchronize their limb movements (e.g. Schmidt et al. 1990; Richardson et al.
2005; see also Schmidt and Richardson 2008 for a review), postural sway (Shockley et al.
2003; Goodman et al. 2005; Richardson et al. 2007) and autonomic responses (Kang and
Wheatley 2017). More recently, neuroimaging experiments deploying hyperscanning
techniques have highlighted that when two subjects interact, their neuronal activity
synchronizes in various regions of interest relevant for social cognition (e.g. Stephens et al.
2010; Liu et al. 2015; Jiang et al. 2015 Liu et al. 2016; see Valencia and Froese 2020 for a
nice review), thereby providing strong evidence in favor of the claim that the neural activity
of interacting subjects synchronizes. Hence, interacting subjects are coupled (according to the
relevant notion of coupling at play here) at multiple levels.
Consider now the computational simulations presented in (Palacios et al. 2020) and
(Friston et al. 2015). If correct, these simulations show that when two or more free-energy
minimizing systems interact with each other, they naturally tend to form a wider system, with
its own Markov Blanket, provided the interacting (i.e. “smaller”) systems have at least some
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prior expectation in common.
But human subjects surely share at least some priors. Some of those are prior expectations
regarding the statistics of the environment, to which all perceptual systems must be attuned
(Orlandi 2014). For instance, humans expect natural light to illuminate objects from above
and slightly on the left (e.g. Mamassian et al. 2002). Other shared priors regard our bodily
dynamics, and the ways in which we can behave to achieve our goals (e.g.Kilner et al. 2007;
2011; Donnarumma et al. 2017). Consider further culturally established prior expectations.
These practices are said to establish regimes of shared expectations among the members of a
culture (Constant et al. 2019b; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: Ch. 5; 2020). Taken together,
all these threads of evidence strongly suggest that humans have at least some common priors.
Hence, if the results of the simulations provided by Friston et al. (2015) and Palacios et al.
(2020) are correct, the interaction of human subjects (which, if PP is correct, are free-energy
minimizing systems) will naturally let a new system, with a “wider” Markov Blanket,
emerge.
It thus appears that, anytime two subjects interact, they can be modeled as two
synchronized Markov Blankets surrounded by a “wider” Blanket. And the internal dynamic
of such a “wider” seems to act as an order parameter on the dynamics of the “smaller”
Blankets it contains: after all, in many cases of synchronization, the order parameter is the
relative phase of the two oscillators (e.g. Haken et al. 1985; Kelso 1995), which seems
precisely what the “wider” Blanket enshrouds.
Notice that such a wider Blanket seems precisely the Markov Blanket that, according to
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, identifies the vehicles of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness.
Hence, if Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s Markov Blanket proposal on how to identify the
vehicles of a subject’s phenomenology is accepted, it seems that interacting subjects end up
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being vehicles of each other’s phenomenology.
This would surely strike many as intuitively unappealing. But intuitively unappealing
claims are not necessarily wrong. Thus, the fact that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s defense of
CVE ends up delivering intuitively unappealing results is not necessarily a problem for them.
What is a problem for them, however, is that such a “multi-subject” Markov Blanket does
not identify a temporally thick model. Yet, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein claim that only18
temporally thick models can be vehicles of phenomenal consciousness (Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019a: 53; 106-107). Hence, the way in which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein resort to
Markov Blankets to individuate the boundaries of the conscious mind clashes with their
theoretical commitments concerning the fact that only temporally thick models can give rise
to subjective experience. So, either the way in which Kirchhoff and Kiverstein resort to
Markov Blankets to identify the boundaries of a subject consciousness should be abandoned,
or it is false that only temporally thick models can be vehicles of consciousness. At any rate,
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s position on the matter seems to lead to an inconsistency.
Something must go.19
Why do we claim that the multi-subject model identified by the “wider” Blanket is not
temporally thick? Recall the heuristic proposed by Friston (2018: 5-6): to determine the
temporal thickness of a model it is sufficient to consider the time lapsed between successive
“visits” to some particular states. The longer that time, the thicker the model. A bacterium,
for instance, might revisit a state x every half an hour. Its model is thus significantly
19 One might object that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein resort to Markov Blankets only to formalize the boundaries of
the mind, which need not coincide with the boundaries of the conscious mind. Yet, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
(2019a: 104) take the machinery PP describes to be the physical machinery of consciousness. And Markov
Blankets presumably individuate the boundaries of that machinery. It is also worth noting that Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein (2019a: 62-63) introduce Markov Blankets to deal with Chalmers’s (2019) argument argument
against CVE. It thus seems natural to think that, on Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, Markov Blankets should
identify the boundaries of the conscious mind.
18 Recall that, in this context, “model” simply refers to the internal states of a Markov Blanket.
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shallower than the model a typical human possesses, given that a typical human visits certain
states only once a year (e.g. throwing a party for one’s own birthday). A temporally thick
generative model loops through its state space; and the temporal trajectory of that loop is an
indicator of the temporal thickness of the model (or so Friston suggests). And if a model
traces no loop in its state-space, then it is not temporally thick.
But, and we believe the following point is relatively uncontroversial, not all human
interactions have the required loopy structure. Surely some human interactions have it: a
group of friends can meet, say, once every year to commemorate some particular event. But
many other human interactions are one-shot interactions. Consider, for instance, an
applicant's interaction with the interviewer during a job interview. Both the interviewer and
the applicant share many prior expectations, and both are prediction-error minimizing
systems. So, if the simulations and the empirical evidence discussed above are correct, it
seems that their interaction will tend to make them synchronize in various ways; and there
will be a Markov Blanket “surrounding” them both. But the model identified through such a
Blanket will not re-visit any of the states it happens to visit in the future - typically, applicants
and interviewers do not periodically meet to re-enact job interviews. So, the model they
jointly instantiate during the interview will not, according to the relevant heuristic Friston
proposes, be temporally thick.
The same, it seems to us, holds true even if a more regimented notion of temporal
thickness is deployed. For instance, temporal thickness is often understood in terms of the
model’s hierarchical structure, in which hierarchically higher levels predict (and postdict) the
incoming inputs at a higher temporal scale (Tani 2016, Ch. 9-10; Friston et al. 2017). It is not
at all clear whether multi-subject interactions have the required hierarchical structure, or in
which sense two interacting subjects compose a functional hierarchy.
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4.3 - DEUTS and the consciousness bloat
One popular objection to vehicle externalism about cognition is the so-called “cognitive
bloat” objection (Sprevak 2009; Rowlands 2010; 2020; Allen-Hermanson 2013). The
objection basically points out that the criteria vehicle externalism offers to identify external
vehicles are too easily satisfied, thereby implying that all sorts of things are vehicles of a
subject’s cognitive state. This is undesirable (if not a reductio of vehicle externalism) because
it marrs the explanatory and scientific credential of vehicle externalism. An unruly amount of
factors plays a causal-explanatory role in accounting for an agent’s cognitive performance,
and surely not all these factors are vehicles of cognition - and defenders of vehicle
externalism do not wish to claim otherwise (Clark 2008: 76-81). Here, we claim that the
DEUTS argument licenses a similar “bloat” worry when it comes to the vehicles of a
subject’s phenomenal consciousness.
To see why, recall the general structure of the DEUTS argument. The first step is a
commitment to dynamicism: cognitive processes are often constituted by agent-environment
sensorimotor interactions. The best way to explain these interactions is through the tools of
dynamical systems theory. Once these tools are deployed, one is often forced to model the
agent and the environment as a single coupled system, whose joint behavior accounts for the
production of cognitive outputs. Hence, cognitive outputs are produced by an “extended”
coupled system; just as cognitive vehicle externalism requires (Chemero 2009; Palermos
2014; Lamb and Chemero 2018; Kiverstein 2018).
The second step consists in showing that dynamically entangled subjects cannot be
phenomenal duplicates only by being neural duplicates. If one closely scrutinizes how the
experience of a dynamically entangled subject evolves over time, one notices that it is
STILL AN UNSUBMITTED WIP, BUT FEEL FREE TO USE 27/41
necessary, in order for a given temporally sequence of phenomenal states to be experienced,
that agent and environment interact in a certain way; and thus that certain environmental
features qualify as external vehicles of experience (Hurley 1998: Ch. 8; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019: 36).
Crucially, this line of thought is supposed to provide a discriminating way to appeal to the
causal spread of cognitive processing in order to establish CVE (Hurley 1998: 330). Every
agent is a node in a massive causal network connecting it to an unruly manifold of
environmental features (e.g. the oxygen an agent breathes), not all of which are putative
external constituents of the agent’s phenomenal machinery. To make her account discriminate
between mere environmental causes and genuine external vehicles, Hurley (1998: 329-332)
reasoned as follows: vehicles explain the obtaining of any particular mental state. The
tokening of an appropriate vehicle is what in virtue of which each and every mental state
obtains. Hence, what needs to obtain in order for a phenomenal state to obtain is the vehicle
of that state. But not every environmental feature needs to obtain in order for a phenomenal
state to obtain. So the argument discriminates between putative external constituents and
environmental factors merely causally impacting upon a subject’s consciousness.
We believe that Hurley’s line of thought is not discriminatory enough. With enough
ingenuity, one can always cook up a scenario in which the DEUTS argument ends up
counting the oxygen in the atmosphere or the paint on the walls one is seeing (or whatever) as
vehicles of a subject’s phenomenal experience. Or so, at least, we contend.
Consider the following twist on Hurely’s thought experiment. Suppose that a subject S and
S’s twin TS are in entirely white rooms, both with a ball at their right. Suppose that the layout
of their environments are identical. The only difference is the amount of oxygen present in20
20 We chose this example because Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020:12) clearly state that they do not wish to
consider oxygen as a constituent of the phenomenal machinery.
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the rooms: whereas S is in a normally oxygenated environment, TS isn’t. In fact, there is no
oxygen in TS’s environment. Lastly, let both S and TS interact with the balls, so as to get
dynamically entangled with the environment.
It seems clear that, given the proposed setup, the phenomenology experienced by S and
TS, as well as their neural states, will diverge drastically. Whereas S will feel what it is like to
play with a ball, TS will feel what it is like to choke to death. Whereas S’s brain will
instantiate rich patterns of activity, TS’s brain will not (at least, not for long). Hence, we
cannot duplicate S’s temporally extended phenomenology in TS. But, as Hurley (1998: 331)
writes in regard to mental states: “if not duplicable, then not the whole vehicle”. Hence, the
entire vehicle of S’s phenomenology has not been duplicated in TS’s scenario. But, by
stipulation, the only difference between S and TS’s environments is the presence of oxygen.
And surely, were oxygen present in TS’s room, TS too would feel what it is like to play with
the ball: adding oxygen would thus allow us to duplicate S’s experience in TS. But then the
DEUTS argument forces us to conclude that oxygen is a constituent of S’s phenomenal
machinery, something that surely Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020: 12), as well as many other
philosophers, wish to deny.
Similar unappealing results proliferate easily. Consider what would happen if the color of
the walls in S and TS’s rooms were different. Or if S and TS’s balls had a different color. Or
if TS were made to wear medieval armor. Or if the rooms had different light bulbs emitting
differently colored light. It seems correct to say that, in all those cases, the temporally
extended phenomenology of S (and the way in which S’s neural states evolve through time)
could not be duplicated in TS. And it seems equally correct to say that, in all those cases,
eliminating the environmental feature acting as a difference-maker in between the two cases
would allow S’s phenomenology to be duplicated.
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But if this is correct, then a systematic application of the DEUTS argument seemingly
leads us to conclude that any (or almost any) environmental parameter contributing to the
temporal unfolding of a dynamically entangled subject’s experience is a vehicle of that
experience. This, it seems to us, is an unwelcome result, for it suggests that the DEUTS
argument leaves CVE open to a nasty “consciousness bloat” objection.
Perhaps the problem could be avoided by supplementing DEUTS with some further
criteria enabling us to discriminate, among the candidate vehicles DEUTS identifies, genuine
vehicles of consciousness from spurious ones. And, if we understand them correctly,
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019b; 2020) propose two such criteria. We examine them in turn.
The first criterion is proposed in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019b: 16-18). The idea21
seems to be the following: an external candidate vehicle of consciousness really qualifies as a
vehicle only if it contributes to an agent’s free-energy/prediction error minimization over
time. As they write:
“The self-evidencing nature of biological agents blocks the threat from
cognitive bloat. External resources form a part of an agent’s mind when they
are poised to play a part in the processes of active inference that keep surprise
to a minimum over time (i.e. that minimise free-energy).” (Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019b: 17).
We do not think that this effectively blocks the threat bloat argument poses. To see why,
consider interoceptive active inference. If PP is correct, brains are busy predicting the
incoming input in all modalities. Importantly, this means that brains will not just try to guess
the incoming sensory signal in the exteroceptive modalities (bluntly put, the five senses
traditionally understood); they will also try to guess the proprioceptive signals (i.e. the
“sense” of kinesthesia and self-movement) and the interoceptive signals (i.e. the “sense” of
21 To be fair, in that paper Kirchhoff and Kiverstein do not detal with CVE directly, but only with cognitive
vehicle externalism. However, since Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 104) take the PP explanations of
cognitive phenomena to be also an account of phenomenal consciousness, the argument they offer to block the
cognitive bloat should also block the consciousness bloat.
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one internal bodily state). Albeit typically associated with emotional responses (e.g. Seth
2013; Pezzulo 2014; Seth and Friston 2016) prediction of interoceptive signals is functionally
on a par with the prediction of exteroceptive and proprioceptive signals. There are thus two22
general ways to minimize error relative to interoceptive predictions: changing the predictions
to make them fit the incoming interoceptive signal or changing the incoming interoceptive
signal to make it fit the predictions. The latters is interoceptive active inference.
A concrete example of interoceptive active inference occurs when humans try to reduce
the error relative to the prediction of their bodily temperature being around 36.6° (Bruineberg
2017; 3). One way to reduce that prediction error is to wear appropriate clothes, given the
environmental temperature (e.g. wearing a sweater during the winter). But, most times,
humans do wear appropriate clothes, given the environmental temperature. So it seems that
clothes are well poised to play the desired error minimizing role over time, just as Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein ask. It thus seems correct to say that clothes are part of the machinery that
minimizes (interoceptive) prediction error on average and in the long run. And given that
Kirchhoff and Kivertein take that machinery to be the machinery of consciousness (Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a: 104; 2020), it seems correct to conclude that, on their account, clothes
are cogs in our phenomenal machinery. This, to us, seems sufficient to conclude that the
consciousness bloat objection is not avoided.
Notice, further, that focusing on the external vehicles that minimize surprise overtime
seems to clash with Clark’s (2017) metamorphosis argument, upon which Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein rely. The reason is this: presumably, the question whether some candidate vehicle
plays an error/free-energy minimizing role overtime has a crisp yes or no answer. Either
something plays such a role often enough, or it doesn’t. Hence, if the suggestion put forth by
22 So much so, that there can be interoceptive perceptual illusions; see (Iodice et al. 2019) for a nice example.
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Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019b) is correct, an agent’s Markov Blanket is somewhat rigidly
fixed. Yet, the metamorphosis argument stresses the plasticity of an agent’s Markov Blanket,
suggesting that it can easily be altered.
Consider now the second anti-bloat criterion, proposed in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2020:
11-12). The criterion revolves around counterfactual manipulations. To understand it, recall
first that free-energy (which, under simplificatory assumptions, corresponds to prediction
error) is the sum of two quantities: the surprisal of a sensory state and the DKL; where the DKL
measures of how much the probability distributions encoded in an agent’s expectations differ
from the actual probability distributions defined over environmental causes.
Provided this, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein suggest that we should identify as external
vehicles of a subject’s consciousness only the elements upon which a counterfactual
intervention would change the subject’s DKL and thus the subject’s phenomenology. In their
view, this simple test is sufficient to tell apart the external factors which are part of a subject’s
phenomenal machinery from the ones that merely causally interact with that machinery
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2020: 12).23
We must confess that we do not see how this simple test can help Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein’s cause, as changes in the DKL are typically associated with perceptual inference. If
a subject correctly determines the external cause of the incoming sensory signals, the
subject’s DKL will be small. Conversely, if a subject mis-infers the cause of the incoming
signal, the subject’s DKL will be sizable. If this is correct, it is obvious that any intervention
on an external cause of the sensory signal will change a subject’s DKL, and presumably the
23 Kaplan’s (2012) mutual manipulability criterion is another criterion that relies on counterfactual interventions
to tell apart the genuine constituents of a subject’s mental machinery from factors that merely causally impacing
it. Importantly, however, Kaplan’s criterion requires at least two counterfactual interventions: a “bottom-up”
intervention on the putative vehicle and a “top-down” intervention on the relevant (allegedly extended)
cognitive phenomenon. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, in contrast, seem only to require “bottom up” interventions on
the putative vehicle. So, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s criterion is distinct from Kaplan’s.
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subject’s phenomenology.
Notice that such interventions will alter the DKL of active and passive perceivers alike:
even if a subject is “perfectly still”, intervening on the environmental causes of their sensory
inputs will alter the subject’s DKL. Thus, the criterion proposed by Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
(2020) seems even less discriminating than the original DEUTS argument. For, according to
the DEUTS argument, something qualifies as an external vehicle of consciousness only if a
subject is dynamically coupled to it. But this requirement is not present in Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein’s (2020) criterion. Hence, it is more liberal than the original DEUTS argument,
and thus cannot be used to solve the liberality problems afflicting DEUTS.
We thus conclude Kirchhoff and Kiverstein additional criteria do not succeed in rescuing
the DEUTS argument.
5 - Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined some aspects of Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s
DEUTS-based marriage of PP and CVE, arguing that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s position is
susceptible to a nasty “consciousness bloat” objection, and that their emphasis on cultural
practices does not contribute to establishing the truth of CVE.
Importantly, if the arguments we have presented here are correct, then, contrary to a
popular opinion (e.g. Clark 2009; 2013; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a), DEUTS is not a
strong argument in favor of CVE, as it is extremely susceptible to the “consciousness bloat”
objection, which is inbuilt in its argumentative fabric.
Notice that we are not implying that CVE is false. There are other arguments in favor of
CVE (e.g. Vold 2015) which might succeed where DEUTS fails. But, thus far, they have
received very little attention: DEUTS has always been the focus of the debate on CVE. We
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thus suggest that time is ripe to put DEUTS in retirement, and find some new argument in
favor of CVE.
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